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DELAY BY THE PARTIES AND DELAY
BY THE COURTS
HANS ZEISEL*

T

EE one good thing to be said for court congestion is that it has

spawned a number of careful studies on the operation of our courts
and has, indeed, marked the beginning of scientific inquiry in the area of
judicial administration. We have had a series of stimulating investigations by the Columbia University Project for Effective Justice, dealing
with, among others, such proposed delay remedies as the master system
in Massachusetts and compulsory arbitration in Pennsylvania. Then'
came a modest but elegant study of the Pittsburgh courts by Milton D.
Green, under the auspices of the Institute for judicial Administration of
New York University. And now we have before us a major contribution to the field from the University of Pennsylvania Law School, setting
out to investigate with care and circumspection the extent and causes of
delay in the major civil courts of Pennsylvania.'
The study is built around a framework of nine stages, which together
form the full course through which a litigated case may pass, beginning
with the period that elapses between the cause of action and plaintiff's
first visit to counsel and ending with the final disposition after appeal.
From a random sample of cases on the trial list, a count was made of
how much time elapses, on the average, in each of these stages. A similar count was made for a sample of "long cases" that had stayed in the
court far beyond the average time. Afterwards, counsel on both sides
were interviewed to establish the reasons for the various delays. These
* Professor of Law and Sociology, University of Chicago Law School.
l A. LiO LIvix & EDWARD A. WOOLLEY, DIsPATcH AID DELAY, A FIELD STUDY OP

JUDICIAL AD.MInISTRATIoN i PENN SYLVA.NIi (1961). Following are some of the
other studies of court congestion, some of which are referred to in the text above.
Four papers from the Columbia University Project for Effective Justice: Rosenberg, Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK.
L.REv. 89 (1959); Rosenberg & Sovern, Delay in. the Dynamics of Personal Injury
Litigation, 59 COLUmf.L.REv. 1115 (1959); Rosenbert & Schubin, Trial by Lawyer:
Compulsory Arbitration of Small Claims in Pennsylvania, 74 EIARV.L.REV. 448
(1961); Rosenberg & Chanin, Auditors in Massachusetts as Antidotes for Delayed
Civil Courts, 110 PENN.L.REv. 27 (1961). From the Institute for Judicial Administration, New York University:
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KALvEN, Js., & BERNARD BUCimOL, DELAY ix THE COURT (1959).
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two approaches are supplemented by a modest effort to ascertain how
much time judges actually spend on the bench trying cases.
Thus, this study concentrates on ascertaining by how much civil cases
in the Pennsylvania courts are delayed; at what stages the delay occurs;
and, finally, what caused these delays. This was done for seven Pennsylvania counties, with special emphasis on Philadelphia and Pittsburgh,
the two major urban centers.
The following table, which records the delay for jury trials in the
Philadelphia courts, shows the type of data that were obtained from the
first research approach, the counting operation. Each stage is defined
by the two listed boundary events, so that stage one covers the time between the cause of action and plaintiff's first visit with counsel. These
time intervals are measured for two types of cases: a random sample
of all disposed cases, and a subsample of the cases that stayed in the court
for an abnormally long time. The table is to be read as follows: on the
average, it took about two months (the figures are rounded off) for a
random case to cover this first period, and so forth.
Delay of Jury Trials in the Philadelphia Courts Average Delay (in months)
Random Sample of
Cases

Stage and Boundary Event

"Long Cases"

Cause of action
1

2

4

5

5

3

8

1

5

10

10

8

45

Plaintiff's first visit to counsel
2
Filing of complaint or summons
3
Case is at issue
4
Case first ordered for trial
5
Case first on trial list
6
Trial begins
7

0"*

0*

3

3

6

8

Trial ends
8
Posttrial motions are decided
9
Final disposition after appeal

TOTAL;

38 months

89 months

* This table is a simplified adaption of chart I, on p. 311 of the study.
Zero months, because this stage lasts only 2 to 3 days, on the average.

**
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This table permits us to see some of the difficulties that confronted
this inquiry. Delay in stages one through three came, of course, almost
entirely from the client and his counsel. Delay in stages four through
six is caused to some extent by the court (in many cases exclusively by
the court) ; but in many cases, counsel contributes to the delay in these
stages. Stage seven is of little consequence, because cases tried before
a jury are almost never interrupted once the trial has begun. And the
posttrial stages eight and nine apply of course only to a minority of cases.
As to the size of these delays, the concentration is clearly in stages five
and six-an average of eighteen months for the random sample of cases,
and of fifty-five months for the long cases. These are the stages for
which primary responsibility rests with the courts.'
Such measurements, together with the interviews with counsel in
these cases, provide invaluable data on the client's own tardiness to visit
a lawyer; on the plaintiff lawyer's delaying the trial date offered to him
by the court; on courtesy consents to the defense lawyer's motion to
continue a case; and, of course, on the court's inability to offer an early
trial. All this is of great interest, and at some points, it would seem that
serious questions of professional ethics might be involved-for instance,
when it is reported that: '
in close to 50% of the long [lasting] motor vehicle
cases it was the negligence of the plaintiff's attorney in failing to answer a
. which
.
call of the trial list or in failing to re-order for trial promptly
was the cause of substantial delay.
Unfortunately, the study does not always make it clear what moved
counsel to delay. To be sure, counsel may not answer a call out of sheer
negligence, but it may also be an intentional move in the interest of his
client because, for instance, the evidence is not fully ready for trial, or
because counsel may prefer that settlement negotiations be continued.
But even if counsel should have so many cases on hand that he is forced
to postpone some, such delay might well be construed to be in the interest
of his client if the client prefers a delayed trial with this particular counsel
to an earlier trial with a counsel who would be less busy but also less desirable. Thus, the study does not always permit us to distinguish between
delay that is in the client's interest, delay that is in the counsel's interest,
delay that is caused by the counsel's courtesy to opposing counsel, and
delay that is simply due to negligence.
2 It would seem, incidentally, that the delay figures for the average cases might
be somewhat on the low side, because the random sample did not include (because
they were not yet disposed of) some of the long cases that should have been part
of it.
3 P. 317.
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The study also has some data that are relevant to the system delay.
It is reported, for instance, that the Philadelphia court keeps a separate
list for jury cases and for nonjury cases; eighty-five per cent of all cases
are on the former, fifteen per cent are on the latter. But since twentyseven per cent of the jury cases reach trial as against twice as manyfifty-four per cent-of the nonjury cases, the relationship of jury to nonjury trials is like (.27 X .85 =) .23 to (.54 X .15 =) .08--or, roughly,
like 3 to 1. But the rules of the court require that only six months of
the ten-months court year be devoted to the trying of jury cases and
that four months be devoted to the trying of nonjury cases, 4 a ratio of
3 to 2. Accordingly, it is not surprising that while jury cases keep piling
. .
up, the "time allotted for non-jury trials was not always needed
some

.

.

.

went unused altogether.

.

.

.

[T]he lists were so

current that judges often did not have enough trial work during nonjury terms." I An actual count of the average number of trial hours on
nonjury days yielded 2 hours, 17 minutes, including "all the five and
ten-minute recesses, of which there were a number." 0 These averages
cover only the days on which a judge actually sat in court; they do not
cover the days on which a judge should have tried a case, but did not.
And on the jury calendar, in six per cent of the cases, "the judge refuses
to hear a case because it is complex and the end of the week is approaching." 7

Such data make it somewhat difficult to share the local (in this case,
not the authors') enthusiasm for the Pennsylvania system of compulsory
arbitration for small claims, where Ersatz-judges work for substandard
fees and supply their overhead free of charge.'
The Levin-Woolley study also has some interesting figures on local
peculiarities of the various systems. For instance, the percentages of jury
cases that are disposed of by adjudication (that is, not by settlement)
differ as follows between the counties:
4 p. 277.
5 Pp. 377, 381.

OP. 85.

7 P. 298.
8The book calls it "The Pennsylvania Contribution" to the cures of court delay.
9 This is a summary of chart II, p. 67.
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Percentage- of Jury Cases that Go to Verdict
Philadelphia

Allegheny (Pittsburgh)

Five Other
Counties

19%

30%

43%

These are challenging figures, because if one knew the reasons why the
settlement ratio in Philadelphia is so high, one might be able to reduce the
trial load in the other counties. Unfortunately, we do not learn these
reasons; hence, we are frustrated in drawing the proper conclusions.
The study thus provides an illuminating analysis of the delay of the
individual case on its way from the cause of action to its final disposition. These are highly relevant data from the point of view of the individual litigant. Yet, the main target of the investigation is the delay in
the system. And, indeed, at first glance, it would seem that the system is
but the aggregate sum total of the individual delays. Hence, an analysis
of these individual delays should be tantamount to an analysis of the system. Curiously enough, this is not the case.

II
It is true that at any one point of time, the sum total of the individual
delays in a court constitutes (and is, therefore, equal to) the delay of the
system as a whole. But, as we shall presently show, the individual delays
are to a surprising degree independent of the over-all delay of the system.
Increasing the delay of an individual case does not necessarily increasethe delay of the system; nor does a reduction of the delay of the individual
case necessarily reduce the delay of the system. The reason why the
system remains unaffected by such changes is that the system, as a rule,
automatically compensates any increase of delay in one case with the
advancement of other cases, and vice versa, thus keeping its over-all
delay unchanged.
To appreciate this, we may visualize all the reasons for delay in the individual case falling into three broad categories: when the parties are
ready, and the court keeps them waiting; when the court is ready, and
the parties are not; and, when neither the parties nor the court are ready,
meaning that even if the parties were ready, the court could not oblige
them.

Let us now relate these three types of delay to a somewhat simplified
model of a congested court system. We will assume that this court system has the following properties:
1. In each pending case, both sides declare to be ready for trial
exactly six months after suit was filed.
15 Journal of Legal Ed.No.1-3
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2. From that point on, each case has to wait exactly three months
before the case is reached for trial by the court.
3. The trial of each case lasts exactly two court days, and (to simplify our model still further) suits are also being filed at intervals
of exactly two court days apart.
4. The court consists of one judge who tries cases to capacitythat is, ten cases, or twenty trial days a month."0
In such a court system, each case will reach the trial list exactly six
months after suit was filed, and the trial list itself will always consist of
thirty cases, a three-months' supply for the judge. Every two days he
will remove one case by trial, and a new one will be added at the bottom
of the list. This case, like all others before it, will reach trial after threemonths' waiting time. Adding the six months' time for preparation,
each case will be tried exactly nine months after suit was filed. Such a
court system would be characterized as having no delay caused by the
parties and three months' delay caused by the court.
Let us now introduce our first modification of the system. Suppose
that, for whatever reasons, some lawyers begin to need more time for
the preparation of their cases. Let us assume that beginning on a certain
date, every other case will require seven instead of six months' preparation. And let us now see what will happen to the system. Up to that
point, every case, according to our simplified assumptions, will have
reached the trial stage exactly (6 + 3 =) nine months after the day suit
was filed, and in the order in which it was filed. After that date, every
other suit will reach the ready-for-trial stage only after seven months,
As a result, for the duration of one month, only the six-months cases will
line up on the trial calendar; but not at the rate of ten per month as before, but at the rate of five per month. Hence, after one month, the trial
list will contain not thirty cases (a three months' supply), but only twentyfive cases-that is, a two-and-one-half months' supply. Ten cases will
have been tried during that month, but only five replaced; and
30 - 10 + 5 = 25. During the following month, again, five six-months
cases will be filed, but also five seven-months cases, delayed from the
previous month will have matured in the meantime. Hence, the waiting
list will from now on remain (25 - 10 + 10 =) twenty-five cases long.
As a result, once a case reaches the trial list, its waiting time is reduced
to two-and-one-half months. But let us now see how this affects the
total time elapsed between filing of suit and trial. For half of all cases
=) 8%
(the six-months cases), the waiting time will be (6 + 2
months; and for the other half (the seven-months cases), the waiting
10 All the numbers are arbitrary and irrelevant for the point we are about to make.
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time will be (7 + 2%/ =) 9 months. But note that the average over-all
waiting time for all cases has remained the same, because (/2 X 8 ) +
(1/2 X 9 2) = 9 months.
Thus, increasing the waiting time of half of these suits had the auto-,
matic effect of correspondingly shortening the waiting time of the other
half of the cases. This will hold true, as we Were able to show in Delay
in the Court,"' for any set of figures, not only the simplified ones in our
example. A number of important conclusions derive from this: V
1. No increase in delay of individual cases can have any effect on
the average delay-thatis, on the system as a whole-as long as the
court continues trying cases at its normal rate, and the over-all
number of cases requiring trial does not change.
2. Individual delay becomes a concern of the system only when a
trial continuance is effected so late that no substitute case can be
obtained and a gap ensues in the trial schedule. Such continuances
should be disallowed with utmost rigor.
3. But except for this situation, the system can only benefit by
delaying the trial of an individual case. As long as a case is not
tried, there is always the possibility that it will be settled without
trial, thereby reducing the system's over-all trial load.
4. Obviously this is only a minor hope for the system; hence, it
must not interfere with the legitimate interests of the litigants for
continuance or advancement.

If a motion for continuance is made

jointly by both litigants, the court's only possible concern is with
the protection of the litigant against a courtesy consent that is really
not in his true interest. If such a motion is opposed by the other
side, the court must weigh these interests; also the defendant's right
to have his case disposed of at the proper or earliest possible time,
whichever the case may be.
To round out these considerations, we shall now reverse our modification of our court model and assume that some lawyers were able to speed
up their preparations. As a result, every other case reaches the waiting
list now a month earlier-that is, in five instead of six months. It requires little mathematics to see that the result will be that this half of the
cases will reach trial half a month earlier, in (5 + 31/2 =) 8 months.
But as a result of this advancement, the other half of the cases will now
be tried half a month later, in (6 + 3 /2 =) 9 months. Again, the
average waiting time remains unaffected, at nine months. From this, still
another conclusion follows:
11 ZEISEL, KAIvym & BuCnnOLz, op. cit. supra note 1, at 53.
12 Id. at 198.
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5. Just as delay of individual cases cannot affect the delay of the
system, advancement of individual cases cannot affect the system,
but benefits only these litigants. The average delay will remain the
same, since the cases whose preparation time did not change must
13
now join a longer waiting line.
To achieve full clarity in the relationship between individual delay
and system delay and derive an important sixth conclusion, we shall now
modify our simplified court model in a slightly different way. Suppose
the preparation time of all cases, through greater solicitousness of the
lawyers, could be reduced from six months to three months. How would
this affect the over-all waiting time for each case? Again, the answer
is: It would not affect it at all. All that would happen is that the trial
(waiting) list would be formed at the end of the third month instead of
at the end of the sixth month, and would, therefore, become twice as long.
The waiting time in the first stage would, indeed, have been reduced to
three months, but the waiting time in the second stage would automatically
increase to six months; the over-all waiting time would be, as before, nine
months, because 3 + 6 is as much as 6 + 3.
We may think of a supermarket in which there is a five-minute waiting
line at the check-out counter and in which every customer shops for ten
minutes before she joins the line. If a speed-up in the shopping method
were to curtail shopping time to five minutes for all customers, they would
reach the waiting line five minutes earlier but they would then have to
wait ten minutes (instead of five) in line. Since 10 + 5 is as much as
5 + 10, the over-all waiting time would remain fifteen minutes. All, of
course, under the proviso that there is no change in the number of checkout counters and the time it takes to check one customer out.
Applying our supermarket example to the court system, we then derive:
6. If all litigants shorten their preparation time prior to the bottleneck by an equal amount of time (however great this time amount
is), the over-all waiting time for each case will thereby not be affected. Or, put differently: No shortening of individual delay time
in stages prior to the bottleneck can have any effect on the system, because it would only increase correspondingly the waiting
14
time at some other stage prior to the bottleneck.
13 The important note played by the average (mean) delay In the measurement
of court delay makes it clear why such measurements ought always to be given In
terms of the mean delay, not the median delay. Many studies give often only the
latter, because it is easier to compute; but it is only with respect to the mean delay
that the system remains invariant against individual delay.
14 Hence, remarks by Levin-Woolley that "an efficient judicial system can eliminate
stage 4 entirely" (p. 262), while undoubtedly true, is relevant only for a court
system in which this is the only delay; obviously it is not a characteristic of the
courts under investigation.
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This is, indeed, the final insight into the relevance of individual delays.
Aside from being important to the individual litigant, they are important
to the system only if the system is up-to-date or becomes up-to-date because the individual delays have removed the waiting line.
In a delayed system, individual delay can affect the system only in one
quite specific way. This follows from the basic insight that must govern
all inquiries into court congestion-namely, that the over-all delay of the
system can be affected (reduced or increased) only in one of two ways:
by affecting the over-all trial load, either by changing the number of cases
requiring trial or the time it takes to try a case; or by affecting the overall trial capacity of the court, either by changing the trial hours per judge
or the number of trial judges. Therefore, only when an individual delay
leaves a gap in the trial calendar that cannot be filled by another waiting
case (and the court's trial capacity is thereby reduced) will it affect the
system. 15 But no assurance comes from this study that the courts appreciate how crucially different such postponements are from all others.1'
The Levin-Woolley book raises still another question. What, if any,
research on the problem of delay should be done in one particular court
system, for which remedial action is considered? To ask the question
differently: which problems are bound to vary significantly from court
to court, and which are bound to show only small differences? Data from
the Levin-Woolley study indicate the general direction of the answer.
They show, for instance, for Allegheny County an inordinately high
percentage of cases settled immediately after the trial jury is sworn,,in,
giving rise to the often-heard suspicion that something is wrong with
the fee arrangements for defense counsel. But in the main, if one
wants to study delay in a particular court system, the task is threefold: First, determine the demand end of our equation-how much courttime would be required to remove the existing backlog? The second job
is to determine the supply end-how much court-time is available? The
third necessary step, how either to reduce the workload or increase the
available court-time, will seldom require basic local studies. The curative
powers of certain specific remedies do not vary much from court to court.
If, for instance, pretrial, centralized calendar, separate liability trials, or
court appointed medical experts should prove useful remedies, the magnitude of their remedial power should be more or less the same everywhere.
And the remedial power of the major cures, more judges or more trial
time per judge, is clearly assessable without special investigation.
15 Conceivably, there are indirect, secondary effects of minor magnitude--i. e.,
long delayed cases might become easier (or more difficult) to settle, but such effects
are difficult to ascertain. See ZEISEL, KALvEN & BucHuOmz, op. cit. supra note 1,

at 111.

16 For instance, nowhere in the Levin-Woolley study are we told how many postponements fall into the one and how many in the other category.
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Seen in this perspective, searching for the many causes of individual
delay performs an important and useful function. But valuable as these
insights are for a variety of purposes, they have no direct relevance for the
problem of court congestion. Dispatchand Delay in a way complements
Delay in the Court by laying bare the anatomy of individual delay where
that other study aimed, at clarifying the nature of a delayed system; it
also strengthens the important trend toward more fact-finding as an aid
to the policy-makers in the area of judicial administration.
Yet, the usefulness of this trend is forever threatened by two dangers:
one is, simply, that the facts may by-pass the issue; and the other is that
the policy-makers may ask for ever more facts-not because they need
them, but because such a request is a convenient way to procrastinate.
And court delay is replete with procrastination-so much so that time
may be running out not only for individual litigants, but also for the system as a whole.
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